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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent~

Case

-vsJESSE lVI:. GARCIA,

f\~ o.

9092

JR~

Dejendfl.nt and
Appellant.

BRIRF OF RESPO:\TDRNT

ST A TEl\,.IENT OF FACTS

Respondent takes the following exceptions to appellanfs statement of f.ac~t.~:
The killing v. ~as not entirely the handiwork of Riven~
burgh, as is sho\vn by the fact that Garcia:P in a statement
taken during the investigation and introduced at the trial
admitted that he was in the attic at the time of the killing:r
that he grabbed Verner~s legs, that he grappled with him,
and that he had an ice pick in his hand. rr. 6741 685)
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Garcia knew of, in advance, and participated in the
plan to kill (T. 366, 674), even going so far as to make
improvements in the borrowed knife (T. 161~ 367).
Under examination by his attorney, Garcia claimed,
contrary to statements made by him earlier and introduced
into evidence by the state> that he thought Rivenburgh
"\vas joking; but it appears that the real truth of the rna tter
is that Garcia went to the attic to kill and had no intention
whatsoever to serve a~ a guard for sodomy.
The plan of action had been mapped out fully, in ad~
vancej and when the fight started {T. 674), Garcia did his
part in executing the plan. It was not a case of his going
to the aid of a stricken companion whom he supposedly
feared, as he· now contends.
Apparently there were two card games involved in
the murder; one before it and one aftert the former serving
as one occasion for planning the killing (T. 383 388~ 672)
and the latter a circumstance set up to provide an alibi.
(It will be noted that all of respondent's references to
the ev]dence relate to the small typewritten number at the
top right margin of the transc.rip t.)

ST A TJ:GJI F~J\l·TS OF POINTS
POI~T

I

KO PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURR:t:;D It\
THE JUDGE~S HAVING A C0~\1 ERSATIO~
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WITII ONE OF THE JURORS OR CONVEYING
THE SUBSTANCE OF IT TO COUNSEL; NOR
WAS APPELLANT DENIED THE RIGHT TO
BE PRESE~1., Arr ALL STEPS OF THE TRIAL
BY VIRTUE OF THE CONVERSATIOI\~
POIKT II
'THE TRIAL COURT DID ~OT ERR ll\ NOT
GRANTil\.. G APPELLAN'r'S l\.fOTIOK J'rO DISMISS NOR HIS MOTION FOR DIREC1~ED
VERDICT.
POIKT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID 1\0T ERR 11\' REFUSING TO GI,7E APPELLA~·T'S REQUESTgD
IKSTRUCTION l\~0. 43.
POil\'T TV'
~rHE TTIIAL COCTIT
11\(~ J!'iSTRUCTIO\J \1"0.

POI~T

DID NOT ERR
20.

Tl\~

G-I'l-

V

THE ·TRli\.L COUH.T DID :-fOT ERR I~ RE~
F·lTSl:.:(~ TO GIVE .l\.PPF:TJL~;\;.JT'S REQUESTED
Il\~STRUC'riO~ NO. l7r
POI~T

VI

THE TRIAL C(JLTRT DID KOT ERR IX RE~
Fl~SI)JG TO GIVE APPELL . ~~T'S
.
REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10 and 21+

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-

FUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 20.

POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 1N
FAILING TO COMPEL THE PROSECUTION TO
FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS AND COPIES

OF ST A·TE~iENTS MADE BY WITNgSSES AXD
DEFENDANT.

POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
FUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL.

I~

RE-

POINT X
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR I~ DEA PPET.J JA 0JT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
TESTIMONY SHO"\VING A CONSPIRACY TO
C01v1MIT MURDER.
~-YJKG

POINT XI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR J~ SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY ON FIRST
DEGREE MURDER AFTER CONSIDERATION
OF APPELLANT~S MENTAL CONDITION .
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
KO PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED IN
THE JUDGE~S HAVING A CONVERSATION
WITH ONE OF THE JURORS OR CONVEYING
THE SUBST Al\'"CE OF IT TO COUNSEL; NOR
WAS APPELLANT DENIED THE RIGHT TO
BE PRESENT AT ALL STEPS OF THE TRIAL
BY VIRTUE OF THE CONVERSATION.
Appellant Garcia was not harmed in any way by the
conversation between the judge and the juror. Nothing
was added to the trial and nothing was taken away+ The
case went to the jury exactly as it stood. The conversation
had no effect. It was not a part of the trial as such; and
defendant's absence was not error~
The judge made a full and honest disclosure of the
substance of the conversation. It consisted of an innocent
question as to whether cettain evidence would be introduced and a noncommittal answer given by the judge, not
dealing in any way with the merits of the case~
The judge did not give any expression of opinion as
to Garcia's guilt or innocence.
In fact~ at the conclusion of the trial, as a further precaution, he gave Instruction No. 25J stating:
~~~If~

during the course of the trial~ the Court
has said or done something 'vhich has suggested
to you that it is inclined to favor the claims or po-
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sition of either party~ you will not suffer yourselves
to be influenced by any such .suggestion.
.t'I have not expressed nor intended to express,
nor have I intended to intimatej any opinion as to
\v hlch witnesses are or arc not worthy of belief, or
what inferences should be dra,vn from the evidence. If any expression of mine has seemed to indicate an opinion relating to any of these mattersj
you are instructed to disregn.rd it . ''

While not admitting any impropriety on the judgeJs
part~ Respondent nevertheless suggests that improper remarks or conduct of the trial judge may be cured by instruction to the jury to disregard themt unless they are
. ~o prejudicial to accused that their affect must be deemed
ineradicable~ 23 C~J~S. ~87(b), page 339.

Our statutes intending to prevent jurors from discussing the merits of matters before them are necessary, of
course. They \vereJ however~ enacted for the purpose o£
keeping the jury from conversing \Vith people who might
try to influence· their opinions.. rrhe judge is in a different
category altogether. Certainly, he is the one truly impartial person involved in the trial and by virtue of hls office
has had long and careful training in refraining from sho"\oving any disposition ~,.hatsoever in favor of either party.
The very nature of our judicial system requires that
the judge be a man in 'vhom trust may be reposed and
whose official statements are to be believed.
The Utah cases cited by appellant in his brief seem
divisible into two categorise: (1) Those involving jurors
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and a third person~ not a judge; (2) those involving a judge
in contact \Vith jurors after the jury has retired to arrive
at a verdict.
In most of the cases:; dealing with third parties, the nature of the conversation is unknown and therefore subject
to unlimited conjecture. Here, however~ the full substance
of the conversation \vas given to counsel in the presence
of the reporter and \Ve know what was said. We also kno\\o'"
that nothing in the conversation \vas acted upon by counsel. 'Ve kno\v that Carcia was not hurL

Compared \\~ith cases dealing with a retired jur)·, thi~
is one in sharp contrasL Here the conversation \vas kno¥l n
in full at a time when som£thing could be done about it by
counsel. There still \\'as ample time for any appropriate motions and any curative instructions that might be necessary. \\:rhere a judge goes to the jury room~ on the other
hand, it is too late then to correct any mistake that might
have been made_
j

Since a trial judge is not only permitted, but it i~ his
duty, to participate directly in the trial and to facilitate
its orderly progress~ his ren1ark.~ or conduct in performing
his duty will not co nsti tutc error if they arc such that do
not discriminate ag~inst or prejudice the accused"~ case.
23 C.J.S. 9R7(a), }Yage 337.

Respondent urges the absence of error in the instant
case. 1.\ everthe les.~ ~ should the court consider the actions
of Judge Jeppson and the juror improper~ respondent still
contends such error is not prejudicial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
In such eventt the 1950 case of People v. Woods;'
(Calit), 218 P.2d 981~ would appear to be directly in point
and its decision should be followed by this court. There
the trial judge in chambersJ in the presence of the reporter
but the absence of defendant and both counselt held a discussion with a certain juror. Largely, the conversation
dealt with the behavio-r of the juror the previous day in
making contact with the district attomey~ However, it
dealt also with matters of substantive law~ The court was
asked by the juror the question: '~VY'bat is a hung jury?'t
The judge gave a full legal answer in responser

Regarding these cricumstances the Supreme Court

stated:
~ ·• * • Private communications bet\v een a judge and
a juror with respect to matters related to the case
are of course improper~ but nothing took place in
the conversation complained of which could possibly have prejudiced defendant and therefore it did
not constitute reversible error~
It

An interesting case involving the conversation of a
juror and a judge is that of State v. Morris, (Ore~)~ 114 P.
476+ There a juror was approached with the offer of a
bribe after testimony had ended but before argument. He
tried to call the judge but failed and then talked to the
prosecutor. The prosecutor called the judge. The judge
and the juror and counsel for the state met at the police
station and discussed the bribery attempt_ The judge then
proceeded to tell the juror not to allow the bribery try to
affect his judgment in the case under consideration. The
Oregon Supreme Court held this conversation not to be
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pre judicia 1 error as misconduct either of the judge or of
the juror, even though it dealt somewhat with the case under consideration, and even though it was held outside the
courtroom.
In State v. Costales~ (N. Mex.), 19 P.2d 189, the judge
sent a communication through the bailiff to the jury after
it had retired~ The rule against communication between
judge and jury was treated there as follows:
~~The

rule has been greatly relaxed in modern
times ( 16 C.J. 1 165)~ and this is reflected in the decision of this court in State v. Cle1n ents 31 ;.J. W.
620~ 249 P. 1003, 1008j where l\ir. Justice Watson~
speaking for the court, said: ~\Ve cannot admit7
therefore, that it is the law of this state that the
bare fact of an unauthorized and improper communication necessitates in all cases a new tria1,
even in capital feloniesL \Vhen it appears that there
has been such communication, the important que~
tion is \vhether prejudice has resulted~ Such a communication certainly requjres cxplanation1' not only
to secure the accused his rightst but to maintain
the court~s authority. But if it satisfactorily appears
that the communication tvas harmless and had no
effect on the verdict, the rights of the accused do
not require1' and public interest does not permit~
the granting of a new trial'/'
J

In \.ilalter v. State, (Okla.), 233 P. 240l where the
judge answered a question of a retired jury through an
intennediary-t the court held thut the communication ~ras
not of great importance and did not result in harm to the
defendant and refused to hold that. prejudicial error had
occurred~
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In Lewis v~ State:~ (Okla.L 119 P.2d 91j the trial judge
had a communication with jurors outside the courtroom
in the absence of defendant or his counsel While the court
granted a new trial under the exact circumstances:P it did
go so far as to say that although there is a presumption of
prejudice under the circumstances~ the state rnay prove
that the defendant was not prejudiced by reason of such
misconduct. In Green v. State,. (Oklar), 281 P .2d 200, the
court again affirmed that the presumption of prejudice
can be overcome by proper proof.
In the instant case the court has adequately proven
the absence of prejudice. The Utah court in an analogus
case, State v~ Burns., 79 U. 57Gt 11 P~2d 605, held that where
the jury separated improperly, the state was entitled to
show that no prejudice occurred therefrom+ See also People v. Alcalde, (Calif..)~ 148 P.2d 627L
7

In People v~ Kasem~ (Mich.L 203 N~W. 135, the judge
had a meal at the same table with jurors and his action
\vas not deemed prejudicial.
In State v+ Newland, (Mo.)J 285 S~WL 400) a foreman
went alone to the judge, asking about certain evidence.
The judge declined to give information ~s to the evidence
and the conversation was held to have been without
prejudice+
Appellant cites a number of cases in this general area,
hut all of them can be distinguished easily from the one
at hand.
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The following are

examples~

In State v. Anderson, 65 U. 415~ 237 P. 941 (App. Brief~
p. 8), a juror and the prosecuting witness had ridden to~
gether to and from court daily during the course of the
trial+ rr he effect y...· a~ that the juror communicated with
the prosecutionj inasmuch as the witness was in continuous contact with counsel for the state+ Here, in the Garcia
case, the juror who talked with Judge Jeppson had no
communication with any party to the action, but only \Vith
the one neutral in the courtroom+ In the Anderson case the
prosecuting witness performed a substantial senrice or
favor for the juror~ and this concerned the court.. That is
not so here.
In Johnson v. JJiaynard) 9 U.2d 268t 342~ P.2d 884, the
judge entered the jury room to answer a question, so the
case is not in point.
In State -c. Thorne,
\vlth someone over the
to the jury. There was
conversation~ held \vith

39 Ur 208, 117 P. 58, a juror talked
telephone after the case had gone
mystery as to the contents of this
an unknown third party~

Cnfortunatel.':r. ~ the prosecution apparently made no
effort to shO\V that the conversation was not prejudicialwhich it had a right to do, according to the follo\ving language of the court:

* * It

is enough tl1ut the stutc * * ~~ is permitted to sho\\~ that the conduct, though wrongful
and ln disobedience of the sttitute and the directions
~'*
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of the court, nevertheless was harmless, by showing all that was said and done, and by clearly and
affirmatively showing that the accused was not,
nor could have been, prejudiced there by.''
Here, Judge Jeppson put the whole substance of the
conversation into the record and since it was not acted
upon by counsel for either party and since he conveyed
no infonnation as to hls o-wn attitude toward either party~
the verdict should not be disturbed.
In State v. Crank, 105 l~. 332, 142 P r2d 178, the court
did not go so far as to decide actually whether the conversation was reversible. There, too:' it involved a juror and
a prosecuting witness.

Appellant cites a number of cases in support of his
proposition that appellant was denied due process in that
he was not present at all stages of the proceedings. In State
v. Jfortensen~ 26 U. 312, 73 P. 562~ defendant refused to
accompany the jury to the scene of the crime for a view
of the premises. Notwithstanding this refusal~ counsel on
appeal claimed that the excursion to the site constituted
a portion of the trial and that he was deprived of his rights
to be present at all stages. The court then went on to state:
~~*

* • but \V"e

are unable to concede that the view
was either a part of the trial or the taking of evidence~ within the contemplation of the Constitution
or the statute.'~
The same rule should prevail here~ The conversation
between the judge and the juror was not a part of the trial
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and appellant's absence therefrom did not constitute a
denial of due process.
In the Mortensen case the court continued:

"* * *

Thit1 does not mean that the defendant must

all the time be in the actual
but rather that he must be at
in its presence~ The court is
and permanent. The jury is
junct for a partia 1 purpose of

pt·esence of the jury~
the trial in court and
the real thing, fixed
but a temporary adthe trial."'

Counsel for appellant was present at the time the judge
told the substance of the converation . That was a parl of
the proceeding~ The incidental conversation was not.
Appellant urges additional error in that the judge not
only had the conversation with the juror~ but also conveyed
it to counseL On the contrary~ the placing of the conver~
sation in the record brought all the facts to light and eliminated any mysterious circumstances that might othenvi~e
have created doubt.
Appcllanfs quotation from Stale v. lY!arti-nez, 7 U.2d
387~ 328 P.2d 102, is far afield froln the case at hand. It
deals with direct questioning of witnesses b~/ jurors. Heret
no such thing was attempted. The juror had no intention
whatsoever to talk directly with any witness. He only
\.\'anted to know if '~c )U n;:.;el was going to introduce a certain tape recording in evidence. Even if the conversation
here had been a direct oner \VithOUt the judge as intermediary, it still V~.~ould have been between the juror and an
attorne.r and not bet\veen a juror and a witness.
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Finally, neither side did anything at all about the information given by the judge. Therefore, if error did occur
in the conversation, it '\vas not pre judicial for the reasons
set out above+

POINT II
THE 'TRIAL COURrr DID 1'\0~"r ERR I~ N01'
GRANTING APPELLA:NTJS rYIOTION TO DISMISS NOR HIS IviOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT.
\Vhi le it is true that the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty,
respondent believes that appellant has tortured the law
in claiming the judge was obligated to dismiss the action
()~ r.o him, or to direct a verdict in hls favor.
If the court were to adopt appellant's theory that
\.\'henever the evidence· indicates a ~'reasonable hypothesis"
of innocence~ the case should not be allowed to go to the
jury, a 11 normal criminal practice \vould be stifled and
perhaps totally destroyed. Any defendant could be expected to conjure up such '~evidence' as would corntitute a
prima facie "'reasonable hypothesisn of innocence and the
state~ s case 'vould automatically dissolve. This is not the
la1-v in Utah.
1

7

It is true that if the state \vere to fa U to produce evidence sufficient to make out the elementH of the crime the
'
court 1v-ou ld be justified in dismissing the action or direct_
ing a verdict. But th~t is not so here.
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Our system of jurisprudence has from earliest times
contemplated that a jury of a man;rs peers should find the
facts of his case~ with the law to be determined by the
judge. It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to
determine the facts in all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the state be \Veak or strong, in conflict~
or not controverted. Evidence may be ever so convincing
that an accused is guilty or innocent of the crime charged,
yet it is for the jury- and not for the trial judge to render
the verdict. See State v ~ Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P~2d 177
4

Where there is adduced, in a criminal prosecution,
competent evidence from \Vhich a jury can find beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant perpetrated the crime
with which he is charged~ there can be no error in failing
to direct a verdict of acquittal. State v. Peterson:' 121 U.
229, 240 P.2d 504.
Addressing itself to the three questions of motion to
dismiss, motion for directed verdict~ and motion for ne"v
trial, the court said in the recent case of State v. Penderville, 2 l~.2dr 281, 272 P.2d 195:

* * It has been repeatedly

held by this court
that upon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict
of not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial court
does not consider the weight of the evidence or
credibility of the 1.vitnesses, but determines the
naked legal propor~i tion of la'v whether there· ls any
substantial cvid~ncc of the guilt of the accused,
and all reasonable inferences are to be taken in
favor of the state. * * ~ As is pointed out in one or
more of these cases, the trial court has a dj sere tion
in the case of a motion for a new trial that it does
not have in case of a motion to dismiss or to direct
H*

1
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a verdict of not guilty. Nevertheless, in either case
if there is before the court evidence upon which
reasonable men might differ as to whether the defendant is or is not guilty, he may deny the
motion/~

Appellant uses State v~ Erwin~ 101 lJ. 365t 120 P.2d
285~ to say that if the facts relied on by the state are not
inconsistent with defend ant! s innocence~ it is established
as a matter of law~ The court there affirmed the decision
against appellant and went on to say:
H*

* * It is not necessary that each eircumstance in

itself establish the guilt of the defendant, but the
whole chain of circumstancest taken together~ must
produce the required proof. State v. Crawford, 59
Utah 39~ 201 P. 1030; State v. J!arasco~ 81 Utah 325t
17 P.2d 919; Terry v. United States_, 9 Cirr, 7 F.2d.
28; State v. Burch, Utah, 11~) P.2d 911.
the other hand~ if there is any substantial
evidence which satisfies the above requirements~
then the \Veight of the evidence is for the jury, and
the court \r-iH not dif;turb the verdict. State v. Lewellyn, 71 UttJh 331, 226 P. 261; State v. Odekirk,
56 LTtah 272, 190 P~ 777.~'
~'On

State v. Lewellyn, 71 U. 331, 266 P. 261t was an adul~
tery prosecution~ Defendant made a motion for directed
verdict. The court said:
(~In 16 C.J. 935:r the conclusions of various
courts are con den sed in the statement:

'~ ~As a general rule the court should direct a
verdict of acquittal * • * where there is no competent evicl ence reasonably tending to sustain the
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charge; or where the evidence is undi~puted and
so weak that a conviction would be attributable to
passion or prejudice, or where it is so slight and
indeterminate that a verdict of guilty would be set
aside, as where the evidence consists solely of the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, or to show defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But the case should be submitted to
the jury and the court should not direct a verdict
of acquittal, if there is any evidence to support or
reasonably tending to support the charge? as where
it i;:.; sufficient to overcome prima facie the presumption of innocence, or where the evidence of a
materia I nature is conflictingr'
""From Pace v. Commonwealth~ 170 Ky~ 560,
186 S~\V-. 142~ we quote the syllabus on this point
as follows:
(~ ~It

is only~ in the absence of any evidence
tending to establish the guilt of the accused that
the trial court will be authorized to gr-ant a perem ptory ins true tion directing his acquittal.~ . . .
HAn able discugsion and determination of the
bounds of judicial authority in considering a motion for a directed verdict is contained in Isbell v_
lr S. 142 C.C.A. 312, 227 }1"7 788~ in which it is made
clear that the court in ~uch case does not consider
the weight of evidence or credib1 Iity of witnesses
but determines the naked legal proposition of law
whether there i.~ any substantial evidence of the
guilt of the accused. 'fhis is undoubtedly the correct rule. See annotation ~Directing Acquittal~~ 17
A.L+R+ 910. The funetion of a court in dealing \vith
an application for a directed verdict must not be
confused with that in considering a motion for a
ne\v trial upon the grounds of insufficiency of evidence. The court has a discretion in the latter case
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v.rhich he does not properly have in the former. The
reason for the distinction is that the order sought in
one case acquits the accused and finally ends the
prosecution, while in the other, the order. if grantedt does not discharge the accused but merely gives
him the advantage and benefit of another triaL The
rule is controlled by the same principles in criminal cases as in civil procedure. .And in a civil case~
Stam v. Ogden P & ]J. Co., 53 Utah 248, 177 P~ 218J
the eourt said:
+

'' ~It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction and
perhaps in nearly every other where the jury system prevails, that if there is any substantial evidence v..~hatever upon \v·hich to ba5e a verdict, the
court will not withdraw the case from the jury or
direct what their verdict should be~.'"'
1

Appellant presents an hypothesist whlch he terms
reasonable, containing ten general elements calculated to
show the innocence of appellant. (App. Brief, p. 29) _4._ll go
to the single point whether or not Garcia knew that Rivenburgh planned to kill Vernert and not just commit sodomy with him.
Garcia does not base his motions on a denial that he
was physically present during the stabbing~ His own state~
ments on the 'vi tness stand~ along "\V ith those transcribed
during the investigation and introduced in evidence~ were
absolutely conclusive as to his participation in the killing~
(T.

366~

573) 599, 677)

·As to the matter of intent, Garcia kne'v of the proposed killing from the very beginning. While he claims
he thought the threats of Rivenburgh were made in a jok-
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ing manner, he specifically admits their being made and
his having knowledge of them before the killing . Lt. William L. Robinson took the stand and read questions asked
by Mr. Banks and answers given by Garcia at an interrogation held under formal circumstances at the prison during
the first stages of the investigation. The statement was
introduced in evidence. Beginning at T . 366~ the colloquy
is as follows:
"Q.. Will you tell us 'vhen you first heard about
this killing?
A.. Well, as far as I can remember~ it all started
\vhen all of us "\Vas up there playing cards. I think
it was Bowne's cell-I ain't sure.
Q. \Vhen was thaf!
~-'\..
Sunday night.
Q. Go ahead~ Jes~c.
A. And I thought it was all a joke at first.
Q. \Vhat wa~ said and by 1.vhom?
/\. Well:r Mack said that he was going to kill the
Polock.''

(T. 366 367. See also testimony at T. 672.)
This conversation necessarily must have taken place prior
to the killing. The threatening words definitely refer to a
future event. N () other reasonable interpreta ti <)11 of the
language used is possible. (T. 674-675.)
1

Further~

Garcia is quoted, in the testimony of Prison
Guard 'Villiam R. Haueter (T~ 674-675), as having given
the following statement in the presence of himself and
several others just prior to the interrogation testified to
by Lt. Robinson~ during the original in vestiga tiont with
questions being asked by Mr. Banks:
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''Ar * * * any-\vay I was not thinking straight I
thought he was joking~ anyway, he said 'Lees go
up and kill the Polack.' The Polock was locked in
his cell, somehow he got out of his cell, but I don~t
know nothing about that. Me and Bowne went up
the front \Vay, and we got laying on the other side
of this big ventilator~ I don't know \\··hat the hell
it

was~

He came up and then Bo\VIle cut out over
there, and then after the pounding and screaming,
then I \vent over there, and I don''t know too well
about it. I know I grabbed his legs~ and I had that~
I had the ice pick~

Q.

You had the ice pick?

A.

Yes.

Q~
)Tow who was with you when Rivenburgh
'Let's go up and kill the Polack'?~'
~~And at that time did he point at anyone?''
~'A.

Yes he pointed at Bo\V11e/'

''Q.

Bowne wa:-J with you?

A~

Yes.

Q.

Did you

A.

Yes.

an~wer

said~

that?

Q. All right. The three of you \\-~ere together when
he said ~Let's go up and kill him.;, Ko\\• did he discuss with you-you said you \Vere supposed to be
the point man+?
A. Yeah. He was supposed to make a punk out

of him or something. I don~t knO\\~ how, or hov.t
he done it, see~ but he had an affair with him before, so he just went up there to make out of him
and have him for his kid~ that's all, how we under~
stood it at first, and then he pulled out this knife.
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Q+ That's 11ack"!
A4 So we thought he was just joking about it, and
we went up there anyw-ay .
Q.

But he said, 'Let's go up and kill him.t Is that

right?~'

"THE 'VIT KESS: He nodded 'yes' . ~J
This is clear and convincing evidence of prior knowledge
on the part of Garcia~ despite his derrial at the tria I.
Since Appellant Garcia's statements, introduced into
evidence~ clearly indicate a foreknow ledge of the crime,
respondent will not labor the matter of exactly where and
when the knowledge was obtained and as to when certain
card games, at one of which the planning may have been
done, were actually held. (App+ Brief, p . 27.)
It should be noted~ however~ that Randel testilied at
T. 269 and T. 299 to the effect that Garcia was in the next
cell to that in which a conversation as to the plans for the
killing took place during a card game. At T~ 32-0 Randel
testified that a person in a cell could hear another in an
adjoining cell talking in the same tone of voice Randel
\\'"as using on the witness stand.
Definitely, then,. there \Vas not just the one card game
after the killing~ but one prior to it also. (T. 388, 672.) The
court had considerable discussion with counsel cr. 383)
dealing with the card games at the time :1-ir. IIansen made
his two motions, the rulings as to which have been appealed fromt and this should clear up the matter.
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Even so, it is not of great importance whether or not
any card game pre-dated the killing in light of Garcia~s
own clear statement, supra, that he had heard Rivenburgh
tell of his plan .
Further testimony as to appellant~s intent is shown
in the following answer from one of Garcia~s statements
given at the time of the original investigation:

''Q. He had screamed before Bowne went over?
A. ~o., he screamed~ so l run over, circled all
around. I was already circling around before the
ye1ling and the kicking started.
Q.
A~
(T~

Urn huhr Did you strike any of the blows?
I can't remember.
677.)

This shows that Garcia began to approach the victim and
to maneuver for position even before any supposed cry for
he1p 1-vas uttered by Rivenburgh or any defensive motions
were made by VeTner. So it was not a case of aiding a
stricken buddy~ It was, rather, part of a carefully preconceived plan to commit murder.

Of course it is absurd to suppose that two grown men
with knives \vere necessary for protection in a homosexual
relationship~ to which relationship Verner was not adverse.
The practice was somewhat prevalent and bodyguards and
lookouts anyplace~ let nlone the attic~ '\v-ere uncommon and
unnecessary.
The fact that Garcia went to obtain a Imife from
l)alton (T. 157}~ made some changes in it (T~ 161)~ and
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went with Bowne to the attic indicate foreknowledge and
intent.
In light of clear law in Utah {See State v. Penderville~
supra~}, it would have been a serious abuse of discretion
for the judge to make any other ruling than he did, considering the evidence adduced. There is no question whatsoever that evidence of Garcia's ·implication in every act
necessary to constitute first degree murder \vas clearly in
evidence at the time the judge ruled and that it was added
to thereafter .

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSIKG TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED
11\STRUCTION NO. 43.
Clearly, a defendant has no right to have an instruction given in his own words where the applicable law is
given by the court. State v. Cox, 106 U. 253~ 147 P.2d 858~
Appellant asked for an instruction using the follo,ving
words:
~~=-r * * you are instructed that whether you make
such a recommendation is entirely within your
discretion to be exercised in any manner and for
any reason you see fit. You are not to be influenced
or intimidated by the Court in this absolute right
of yours as jurors.''
(R~

95)

The court instead gave its Instruction No. 17 ~ 1Nhich states
in part:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

"* * • and if you find the defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree, then you should consider
the question of making such recommendations; and
in considering this questiont you are instructed to
give it your careful and con scien tious consideration~
and if made~ you must include it in your verdict.H
(R~

115)

Appellant claims prejudice not only because of the
terms UBed in the court~s instruction but aL::o in view of
Instruction Nor 7, which states in part:
''Prejudice, passion and sympathetic feelings
have no place whatsoever in your deliberations~
You should disregard all bias~ prejudice:r and other
extraneous influences.''
(R~

103)

Appellant points to the instruction given in the case
of State v~ Thorne) 39 U. 208, 117 P. 58, wherein the court
said:
'~* * * And if you should find the defendant guilty
of murder in the first degree you should then consider the question of making such recommendation.
and it will be your duty to consider such question
i11 the same manner as any other question submit~
ted to yon, giving to it your careful and conscientious consideration; • * * .:.~ (Emphasis added.)

The court held that the italicized part of this instruction was error because in giving it, the court undertook
to guide and direct the jury in the determination and exercise of a discretion which the law conferred on then1 in
terms unlimited and unprescribed~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
Things are entirely different here since all of the offensive language found in the Thome case has been
deleted.
In State v. M ewhinney:o 43 U. 135, 134 P. 632, the court
failed to find error in an instruction stating:
'~In

considering this question you are not restricted by any rule of law or public policy, but
are entitled to decide the question from such considerations as may appeal to you as reasonably and
conscientiously en titled to be ~reighed in de~
termining the giving or 1vithholding of such
recommendation~~'

The court found the defendant's attempt to bring the above
instruction under the rule of the Thome case untenable
for the reason that the court did not attempt to direct or
control the judgment of the jury. The ],.fewhinney instruction certainly is more questionable than the one here:o
especially considering its use of the terms "reasonably and
conscientiously.' Therefore~ it would be improper to deem
Instruction ~ o. 17 error.
1

Respondent cannot concede that appellant suffered
any real prejudice by virtue of any relationship that might
exist between that portion of Instruction No . 7 dealing
with prejudice, passion} etc~ and Instruction No. 17} supra,
llealing with recommendation of mercy.

Certainly, Instruction No. 7 is a standard instruction,
the essence of which has been incorporated in many cases
and which clearly expresses the proper approach that
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must be taken by the jury in considering the case as a
whole. It cannot cy its terms be considered in any way
to limit the right of a jury to make any recommendation
it may desire for any reason whatsoever. In fact the por~
tions excluding '~prejudice and passion~'' might well be considered by the jurors as an invitation to make a recom~
mendation of niercy) rather than a restriction against doing
so.
Appellant~s

claim is founded upon a supposition too
vague and too remote.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVI~G INSTRUCTION NO~ 20~
Appellant objects to that portion of Instruction No. 20
~T hlch states as follows:
are instructed that one who keeps watch
""'""here a crime is being perpetrated) so as to facilitate the escape of one actually committing it, or
to prevent his being interrupted, if the said keeping
watch i:1 pursuant to a common design to commit
the crimeJ said person keeping "\Vatch.~ is aiding and
abetting' and is a principal. n
~'You

{R. 119) (EmphasiB added)

Appellant says the jury could have construed the
terms ~'a crimen and uthe crime~' so as to refer to the act
of sodomy. This~ of course~ is untenable.
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The only reasonable interpretation
struction is that it applies to the crime
gree murder, to which the jury was
attention. Appellant never was charged
sodomy~ and the jury knew this.

of the court~s incharged, first dedirecting its sole
with the crime of

It appears that appellant is d eating in semantics~ intending to hang his case on single words and phrases as
Bga inst the entire instruction and, in fact, as against all

the instructions taken as a

whole~

In Bridges v. U. S.;o 199 Fed.2d 811, the court said:
~'*

*

* Instructions given in a criminal prosecution
may not be· taken apart and a phrase here and a
clau~e, or even a sentence or paragraph, there used
to find error.H

In People v . Marsh, (IlL), 85 K . E.2d 715, the court
stated:

* *

~4-ccuracy

in the use of language in an instruction containing a correct proposition of law
would, of course:r be desirable, but it is not always
obtainable. For that reason we announced the r11le
that it is s uff i c i ent if the series of ins tru ctio ns, con~
sidercd as a whole, fully and fairly announce the
law npplicable to the theories of the People and of
the defendant~ respectively. People v. lJe Rosa~ 378
u*

111. 557., :19 ):[. E .2d 1; J:leople
170~ 1G3 N ..I:G. 39."

't;.

Hichette, 324 Ill.

In Taylor v. Sta.te:o (Okla.)~ 208 P.2d 185, it \Vas held
that even where it appeared that the instruction complained of was ~~most poorly \vordedt'' but not misleading
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in light of ali the instructions, it did not constitute reversible error.

In State v ~ Zeimer, __U ___ , 3 47 P2d. 1111, decided
January 5, 1960j the court treated a similar question
where, in an habitual criminal matter, the instructions
referred to the charge as an offense~ to the question of defendanes guilt, and to the burden of proof necessary to
conviction. There the court said~
"While defendant is semantically correct, he
is legally without reversible error because the instructions are not prejudicat The jury was instructed upon the meaning of habitual criminal and
upon the required elements and burden of proof.''
Furthermore, the law in Utah is that all instructions
are to be considered together and construed as a whole.
State v. Evans, 74 U. 389t 279 P. 950; State v. Hendricks,
123 U. 267, 258~ P.2d~ 452+ The jury in the instant case
knew this was so by virtue of Instruction No. 28~ which
states as follows~
'~These instructions are to be considered al ~
together as a \Vhole, and not as if each instruction
\vere a complete statement of the law by itself~
And even though a role, direction or thought is
stated in different ways and repeated in more than
one instruction you should not give it undue emphasis and ignore others. But you should consider
all of the instructions as a whole and apply them
all to the evidence in the light of all of the
instructions~'~

(R. 129)
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Considering all the instructions together, as we must
dot any possible error is corrected by Instruction No. 6,
\li.rhich reads as follows:
'~There is some evidence in this case of the
commission of other crimes. There is no crime
charged, however, in this case except murder and
the included offenses which will be described herein. Testimony of any crime not cha:rged is not evidence that the Defendant is guilty of murder or the
included offenses.
lf another crime is connected with the alleged
murder, you .may consider said other crime as you
would any other act relating to the alleged circumstances connected with the alleged murder.''
4

'

(R. 102}

Appellant claims the jurors were biased and prejudiced against him for the reason that sodomyt ~~the crime
against nature," for which he claimed to have been a lookoutt is capable of engendering deep-seated pre judices
against anyone connected with it~ and says it would be
difficu 1t for the jurors to appreciate the fact that no one
was being prosecuted for perversion. Instruction No. 7
would tend to eliminate his objection in stating:
'~Prejudice) passion and sympathetic feelings
have no place "\Vhatsoevcr in your deliberations~
You should disregard all bias, prejudicet and other
extraneous influences.~'

(R. 103)

Even if error occurredt it was fuliy cured by all the
instructions taken as a whole and there is no prejudice
here.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
POINT V
THE TRIAL COCRT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE Al)PELLANT'S REQUESTED
I='J"S1,RUCTION NO

17~

Appellant claims error in the refusal of the court to
grant an instruction directing that his motive be considered as strong evidence of the guilt or innocence of the
accused and that:
~'*

**

The absence of a motive on the part of the
defendant * .;i; * strengthens the presumption of defendant~s innocence and may raise a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.''
The refusal was in no way prejudicial to appellant
in Jight of all the instructions given in the trial. (See argument under respondentts Point IV.) While it is. true
that motive may be considered as any other fact~ it is also
true,. as stated in the case of People v. Tom Woo.t (Calit),
184 P. 389 that:
1

~ ·*

* * if the proof

of guilt is nevertheless sufficient
to overthrow the presumption of innocence~ the appellant must stand convicted, notwithstanding no
motlve has been shown_,,
In Glnh'S ·v. State;> (Ala.}} 41 So. 727, the court held that
in a prosecution for murder an instruction, that if the state
failed to sho\v any motive on the part of defendant to commit the offense charged and his guilt was not clearly prov~
en, such absence of motive considered in connection with
all the evidence in the case might in the minds of the jury
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create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, was
erly refused. See also 23 C~J.S. 1198, pg. 749.

prop~

POINT VI
'"fHE TRIA. I-' COLTRT DID 1\"0T ETIR 1).]" ITl:SFUSIN{; TO Gl v·r~ APPELLJ\N'r'S REQUESTED
IKSTRUCTIO='fS :\J(JS. 19 AKD 21.
Appellant \Vas not entitled to have instructions given
in his own words fot· the reasons set forth earlier in this
brief. He was entitled only to a fair statement of the la\v
applicable to his case. His requested Instructions 19 and
21, are sub stan ti{llly covered in several instructions actually given to the jury, since all go directly to the question
of his intent See Instructions Nos. 9, 11t 12 and 16.
The court did not commit error here and no harm of
any kind 'vas done to Garcia~

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURrr DID NOT ERR I~ REFUSI)J"G 1~0 GIVE APPELL1\NT'S REQt~ES1.ED
INSTRlJCTIO~ l\0. 20.
The legal substance of appellanCs requested Instruction l\To. 20 (App. llrieft pg~ 38) is fully ~et forth in the
court"s Instruction :\J o. 7. The last paragraph thereof states
as follows:
~'To

\varrant you in convicting the defendant,
the evidence must~ to your minds, exclude every
rea so na bl e hypothesis other than that of the guilt.
of the defendant. That is to say, if after an entire
consideration and comparison of all the testimony
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in the case, you can reasonably explain the facts
given in evidence on any reasonable ground other
than the guilt of the defendant, you should acquit
him.t~ (R. 103)
This is not an abstract instruction. It applies exactly to the facts at hand~ Stated in his own way, appel~
lan tt s requested instruction limits the jury to a
consideration of just tV\~o hypotheses-one~ standing guard
for sodomy, and two, having the intent to commit the
crime of murder.

The instruction given, however, does not so l.i.mit the
jury. In fact~ if the jury believes any other reasonable hypothesis than that urged by the state, the defendant cannot
be convicted. Thus~ Instruction No~ 7 gives even greater
leeway to acquit than does the proposed instruction.

It is possible the judge could have used more exact
language even though the instruction cannot really be
called abstract. Nevertheless, there is no question that by
it, the jury was given to know its responsibility.
This was a clear-cut case and the court, even if it
detects error, should follow the reasoning of Justice Wolfe
in his dissent in State v. Thompson;! 110 U~ 113_, 170 P.2d
153:
~'*

*

A slight fault in a close case may be prejudicial whilst in a case where the evidence is such
that it \vould be most unlikely that the jury could
ha,.=-e been misled by error~ it would not be
$

prejudicial.j~
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POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT DID .NOT ERR IN
FAILING TO CO~-IPEL THE PROSbCL'TIOl\T TO
FURNISH TAPE RECORDIKGS AND COPIES
OF ST A TE:rviE~TS 1viADE BY WITNESSES AND
DEFENDANT~

It is a discretionary matter with the trial judge n.s to
how far a defendant should be allo\ved to go in the examination of notes, statements and recordings made prior to
trial by the prosecution.
l\ defendantts request :must be based on an appreciable

showing \vhy such statements and recordings should be
produced~ That was not done. vVhether or not accused has
made a showing sufficient to entitle him to have the docu~
ments produced L'3 a matter which rests in the discretion
of the trial courtr 23 C~J.S. 855~ pg. 58.
Here~

the court, for reasons satisfactory to it~ did not
see fit to order the prosecution to give certain wire recordings to defendant However~ they were available for inspection by the defense andt in fact, 1Nere heard by counsel for
defendantj even though the recordings were not used in
evidence. Copies of written statements were also provided
for defendanf~ counsel; so, appellant~s motion is without
merit

Certain statements were used to impeach Garcia and
he was asked whether or not he had made the statements.
In many cases, he answered in the affirmative. If appellant had told the truth all the 'vay through from the be-
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ginning of the investigation to the end of the trial, his
testimony would have been consistent at all times, and
possession of the statements would not have been of any
assistance to him~
The judge did not err in limiting the scope of the
production Gf documents in this matter. If, in fact, there
was error, it was not prejudicial in light of all the evidence
in the trial.

POINT IX

THE TRIAl-~ COURrr DID )JOT ERR IN REFCSll\G TO GRANT A 1\E\V TRIAL.
Appellant claims a ne'\v trial should have been ordered
for reasons set forth in his motion~ But, in his argument
he discusses but three of the seven grounds. Inasmuch as
the others appear to be without foundation, respondent
will deal only with those argued~
The first ground is that the trial \\-~as had in the absence of the defendant. The second ground is that the jury
received evidence out of court. Both of these points were
fully argued in respondenfs Point I of this brief and any
repetition here would be an imposition upon the court's
time.
A ppeJlant alleges as his third ground that a new trial
should be granted because of the separation of jurors for
the purpose of going to restrooms. There is no allegation
or ev ide nee -..,v hatsoever that the jurors talked with any-
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body except each other at that time and the fact that the
elevator would not accommodate a dozen jurors and a
bailiff without creating a dangerous hazard made it imperative that if they were to avail themselves of this means
of transportation, and the desired relief, they 1vould have
to divide into two sections.

It 'vas held in State v. Jarrett~ 112 U. 335~ 187 P42d 547
that an interpretation preventing jurors from separation
for purposes of necessity 1..vould be an unreasonable construction of the statute. The court said:
j

'' • * * r'rhe right of a defendant to ha\:"e a jury secluded from outside influences \V hile de Iibera tin g
should be jealously guardedr However~ this right
must not be founded on an unreasonable and an
un,varranted construction of a statute. The statute
must be: construed in regard to the correlative
righ t:3 of the defendant and the jurors.'~
POINT X
THE TRIAL COUnT DID :\rOT EllR 11\ DE)J\Tll\G APPELLA:J1''S ?dOTIOK TO STRIKE
TESTIJ\10NY SIIO"\\riNG A CONSPIRi~. C\~ TO
CO:f\-'T~·fTT

MURDER.

An actual conspiracy to commit murder 'vas entered
into by all the participants in the killing, including Garcia.
The jury was convinced that Garcia kne\v in advance
about the murder and that this knowledge derived from a
conversation at which both he and Rivenburgh were present~ along with others~ before the killing.
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"\

That thls is so~ is shown in the statements of
Garcia himself taken during an investigation at the State
Prisonj which statements were read into the record by Lt.
Robinson and Sgt. Haueter under examination by Mr.
Banks~ See discussion under respondent~s Point I.
Thus, an actual conspiracy was made out by the evidence and the judge did not err in refusing to strike evidence as to it.

POINT XI
THE TRIAL COURT DID )JOT ERR I)J SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE Jl:R"'Y~ ON FIRST
DEGREE MURDER AFTER CONSIDER1\TION
OF APPELLANT S MENTAL CONDITION.
1

Appellant urges that the jur:y could not rightly find
beyond reasonable doubt that he was capable of premeditation and deliberation. He deems this true because of
statements made by hls psychlatrist, Dr. Nelson.
The state, however~ placed two psychiatrists on the
stand (T~ 651), both of whom testified that Garcia knew
the consequences of hls actst that he knew they were
wrong according to la-\v and morals~ and that he could
control his impulses; and one of whom gave an opinion on
the matter of premeditation and deliberation contrary to
that of appellant's 'Witness.

The princip Ies set forth at Point I I~ supra~ d eating
with reasonable hypothesis} etc.,. apply here just as in the
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determination of the other facts of the case, and that argument is adopted here .
Again it is the sole and exclusive province of the jury
to determine the facts even where evidence is in absolute
conflict, and this is so even as to the question of sanity
State Vr Green, supra+
L

The mere existence of conflict in testimony, and even
the alleged closer contact of one doctor than the other
with the defendant does not in any way foreclose the
court from submitting the question to the jury-. Any doubt
as to the ability of appellant to premeditate and deliberate
"\vas a matter for determination by the jury and not by the
judge. The court~ therefore~ committed no error.
CONCLUSION
Appellant was given a proper trial by an experien-ced
and capable trial judge before a fair and impartial ju1y.
The trial was conducted without prejudicial erTor+ Appellant's appeal is groundless and his conviction should be
affirmed~
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